Teaching Comparative Government and Politics

Thursday, February 04, 2010

Iran's future

Said A. Arjomand is a Professor of Sociology and Director of the Stony Brook Institute for Global Studies, State University of New York Stony Brook, New York. He wrote recently about how he views the future of the Iranian regime. In the process he makes some interesting assertions about revolutions and dictatorships.

Iran’s Revolutionary Echoes
Iran’s continued unrest, now extending through the 30th anniversary of the revolution that toppled the Shah, raises the question of whether the Islamic Republic is about to fall. As in 1979, millions of Iranians have taken to the streets, this time to protest electoral fraud in the presidential vote last June.

The cheated presidential candidates, both veterans of the revolution, instinctively thought of a replay of history...

And yet we risk being led astray by memories of 1979. It is far too soon to predict another revolution. But the divide between Iran’s society and its government is much greater today than it was under the Shah 30 years ago. Change seems just as inevitable...

The greatest difference between 2009 and 1979 was created by the revolution itself. Revolutions give birth to a new political class, and Iran’s Islamic revolution was no exception. The Iranian leadership formed after the revolution consisted of a narrow ruling stratum and a much broader supporting group that was given charge of administration and political mobilization.

In the 20 years since Khomeini’s death, the composition of this political class has changed drastically. The clerical elite has gradually lost power to the military-security groups, from whose ranks President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad emerged. Bureaucratic and security services dominated by the Revolutionary Guards and its militia, the Basij (Mobilization Corps), are now firmly in command.

The leader of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, blessed the Revolutionary Guards’ decision to steal the presidential election. By identifying squarely with the military-security apparatus headed by Ahmadinejad, Khamenei has alienated an important segment of the ruling clerical elite. He has also reduced his own status as the ultimate arbiter in Iranian society…

The growth of Khamenei’s personal, extra-constitutional power introduces a strong element of uncertainty into Iran’s future. Political regimes that rely on personal power, commonly known as dictatorships, prove to be fragile in crisis. This was the weakness of the Shah’s regime, which collapsed as he became paralyzed in his decision-making…

The ayatollah-dictator and the Revolutionary Guards have tried their best to discredit their opponents by concocting, through forced confessions at show trials, a conspiracy of regime change based on a “velvet revolution” produced by “Western social sciences.”

Deep down, they know there is no conspiracy. Their fear is grounded in what they see in front of them: the forward march of history.

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