Populism in Iran
Western media are focusing on apparent disagreements between Iran's conservative clergy and President Ahmadinejad. Since the Iranian president has promoted Iran's nuclear program, he hasn't been very popular in the west, therefore any hints that he might be in political trouble are welcome in most places in the U. S.Here's another perspective on Ahmadinejad's political position from M K Bhadrakumar, a veteran Indian diplomat, in Asia Times Online. This article offers a number of analytical perspectives that differ from those that show up in the Western press. He emphasizes is the role of bazaaris and left-wing political ideas in Iranian politics, which are often neglected in American journalism. (How well does your students' textbook deal with those topics?)
Could your students find information to evaluate Bhadrakumar's assertions?
Ahmadinejad held hostage to bazaar politics
"In the geography between the Arabian Sea and the Levant, there is only one country where it is possible to fancy that an elected government could tumble because of the price of tomatoes in the bazaar - Iran...
"The main thing about Ahmadinejad that irritates Washington is his immense popularity within Iran... Ahmadinejad is the first populist leader Iranians have known...
"Quite naturally, Ahmadinejad doesn't represent all political forces in Iran... He poses a challenge to powerful sections of the ruling elite. His brand of revolutionary Shi'ism unnerves the conservative clergy. He spreads unease in the bazaar with his program of social justice... Again, Ahmadinejad puts off Iran's middle class and intelligentsia by his sheer earthiness... in terms of electoral arithmetic, the alliance between the conservative clergy (including Rafsanjani), the bazaar and the 'reformist' camp, which was patently an unholy coalition scrambled together for the sake of stalling any 'Ahmedinjad wave', prevailed...
"Some naively wondered whether Ahmadinejad was on his 'way out'. But that's not the way politics works in Tehran. The conservative clergy knows that the system based on the doctrine of velayat-i-faqih... does not any more appeal to large sections of the Iranian people, including sizable sections of clerics. The corruption that began entrapping the religious establishment during Rafsanjani's presidency (1988-96) became legion. The electoral victory of Ahmadinejad in August 2005 was a wake-up call that the impoverished Iranian people were yearning for change...
"The domestic political challenges for Ahmadinejad come on the issues of economic policy, and not on account of what he has said about the Holocaust (which Khamenei publicly endorsed) or on account of his so-called 'hard line' on the nuclear issue (on which there is vehement public opinion supportive of Iran's 'natural rights'). The prospects of his re-election in 2009 will depend on how he wards off challenges on the economic front...
"Ahmadinejad has resorted to a policy of government spending... oil money into government-run projects for creating jobs. This has been a successful populist measure and it explains the popularity that Ahmadinejad enjoys in poorer communities. Unemployment fell last year to an eight-year low of 10.3%. But there has been a downside.
"First, his policy of low interest rates drove up lending and led to inflation...
"Ahmadinejad 's policy, which puts emphasis on the public sector, virtually sidelines the Iranian bazaar. Now, the bazaar in Tehran has traditionally called the shots in the country's political economy. The nexus between the bazaar and the clergy has begun reacting to Ahmadinejad's redistributive economic policies. The bazaar has shown it wields clout within Parliament. Rafsanjani has openly called for privatization and a market-oriented economy.
"'We should harmonize our economy with the global economy as soon as possible ... We should activate the private sector in such a way that people can feel assured that the government will fully support their major investments ... We should take the private sector seriously,' he recently said...
"The bazaar has signaled to Ahmadinejad in unmistakable terms...
"Iranian media reports show that from January to late August last year prices of fruit and vegetables in urban areas rose by 20%. During the Ramadan season, the price of fruit doubled and that of chicken increased by 20%. By October, in the run-up to the recent elections that Ahmadinejad 'lost', his approval rating dropped to 35%...
"The nexus between Shi'ism and the bazaar is age-old. What prospects does Ahmadinejad have by tilting at the windmills of this historic nexus? Gripes over the price of tomatoes could after all form part of a critique."
posted by Ken Wedding @ 9:56 AM
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